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The Jurisprudential Cab Ride: 
A Socratic Dialogue 
. Daniel A. Farber* 
Socrates used to say that true education involved a teacher 
sitting on one end of a log, talking with a student at the other 
end. Often, however, I've found that it's more productive to sit 
on the student and talk to the log.' 
The scene is an urban street-corner on a winter night. A light 
snow is falling; although the ground is still clear, visibility is 
poor. There is little traffic. K., a young law professor, is pacing 
nervously, waiting for a cab. K. may be played by either a man 
or a woman, at the director's discretion, but must be portrayed 
as young and serious looking, though easily prone to anxiety 
attacks. After a hard day at work, K. has recently finished an 
unsuccessful and rather frustrating shopping trip, marked by 
unsettling herrneneutical perplexities.' The stores have now 
closed, and employees and shoppers have left for the night, 
leaving the street deserted. Suddenly, out of the swirling snow, a 
cab grinds to a halt. K. jumps in and announces the destina- 
tion. The cab has seen better days and smells vaguely of cigar 
smoke. The driver may be pictured as looking like the Kojak 
character on the old T.V. show, but is chewing on an old cigar 
rather than a lollipop. 
CABBY: So what do you think about all that Clarence Thomas 
stuff? 
K. Iglumly]: To tell you the truth, I can't even stand to think 
about it right now. 
During the next several speeches the cab shoots down the street, 
careening wildly around corners and swerving to avoid the few 
* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
1. Attributed to the late George Stigler by my colleague Gerald Torres. 
2. See Daniel A. Farber, The Deconstmted Grocery List; 7 CONST. COMMEN- 
TARY 213 (1990). 
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pedestrians still on the street. (This should challenge the set 
designer.) 
CABBY: Kinda makes you think about what kind of guy ought 
to be a judge, don't it? I mean, do you need to have like a good 
character or just be smart? 
K.: I'm sorry, but I'm really beat. I just don't feel much like 
talking. 
CABBY: Hey, you know what I always say: the unexamined cab 
ride ain't worth taking. 
K.: I've had a horrible evening, and I'd just like to sit here if 
you don't mind. 
CABBY [obviously determined to chat anyway]: Well, in my cab, 
you got the right to remain silent, but you got no right to an  
attorney, if you know what I mean. 
K.: That's O K ,  I'm a lawyer anyway. Or a law professor, at 
least. 
CABBY: Really? Just  like that Anita Hill, huh? What kind of 
stuff you teach? 
K. [wearily]: Several different things-depends on what the 
Dean wants. Sometimes it's Contracts, sometimes it's Civil 
Procedure. lyawns] Next time, who knows, maybe it's Tax or 
Bankruptcy. Any course that  no one else wants-that's what I 
get. Hey, you know how it is, when you don't have tenure you 
have to jump through all the hoops. Right now I'm teaching 
Jurisprudence. 
CABBY: Yeah? What's that? 
K.  [not wanting to be rude, but hoping to end the conversation 
with the garrulous driver quickly]: Oh, it's like the philosophy 
of law. What is law, is it immoral to violate the law, what is 
justice, that type of thing. [morosely] A lot of the students think 
it's kind of abstract. You know, not the kind of thing they're 
going to use on Wall Street. 
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CABBY [enthusiastically, and oblivious to the total lack of inter- 
est displayed by his audience]: Oh no, that's great stuff. [He 
turns his head to address K., narrowly missing a parked car.] 
Back in the old country, guys used to love to talk about that 
philosophy business. I could sit for hours down in the 
Agora-you know, it was like downtown in the old days-and 
listen. Fact of the matter is, I don't know nothing about that 
stuff myself. [He suddenly slams on the brakes, bringing the car 
to a screeching halt at a red light.] All I ever did was ask a 
dumb question now and then, you know what I mean? And 
usually, I couldn't even understand the answer. What a dum- 
my! Still, it was a lot of fun. Of course, that was a long time 
ago and Athens was a lot different in those days. 
K., who hadn't really focused on the cabby before, looks at his 
license and sees that the cabby bears the name of a famous 
Greek philosopher. K. is too tired to continue the conversation, 
however, and the two lapse into silence. K. is deep in  thought 
about how to complete an article in time for the tenure vote. 
Suddenly, K. notices that the cab has been stopped at the red 
light for what seems like a very long time. In  fact, the driver has 
gotten bored and has started reading a book. K. is getting impa- 
tient about the delay and, afier waiting what seems like a n  
eternity, finally decides to speak up. 
K. [dirnently]: Excuse me, but are we going t o  sit here all 
night? 
CABBY [bruskly]: Well, there's a red light, if you didn't notice. 
K. [in a wheedling tone]: Yeah, but we've been sitting here 
forever. Can't you just go? 
CABBY: Run a red light? Me? You gotta be kidding; I'm a law- 
abiding citizen. What about my license? 
K. [exasperated]: But it's the middle of the night! There's no 
place for a cop t o  be hiding. 
CABBY butting down his book and starting to look interested]: 
You think I should only obey the law if I might get caught? 
And you a law prof. and all! No wonder we had Watergate. Is 
that what you guys teach at that law school of yours? 
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K. [defensively]: Well, obviously no. But there aren't any other 
cars, so there's no chance that you might cause an accident or 
anything. 
CABBY [not giving any ground]: Maybe so, but it's still against 
the law to run a red light. Don't I have a duty to obey the law? 
K. [now on familiar ground; this is a discussion K. has had in 
class with students]: You can't always obey the law. Look a t  
Nazi Germany, or sit-ins against segregation. 
CABBY: O.K., but we're not talking about any big deal moral 
crisis here. I mean, this is just a cab ride, for heaven's sake. So 
there's no higher moral value in the picture. Isn't there a duty 
to obey the law under normal-type circumstances? 
K.: Aha, that's what we call a prima facie duty. There's been a 
lot of recent thinking about that. Lots of law review articles, 
and that kind of thing. Big think stuff. 
CABBY: I'm just a cab driver, but say, maybe you can explain it 
to me. 
K. [warming to the pedagogic task]: Think of it this way. You 
have a moral obligation to take the best course of action while 
taking into account all of the circumstances. At least, that's 
what people like me think. 
CABBY: Seems reasonable to me. [Mulls the matter over.] How 
could it be wrong to do the best thing taking into account all 
the circumstances? O.K., I can buy that. 
K. [feeling. a short-lived burst of energy]: Then the rest of the 
argument should be easy. The fact that there's a law on the 
subject might be relevant to one of those circumstances. For 
example, if there were anyone around and you ran the light, i t  
might encourage disrespect for other laws. But no one is here 
to see you, so it's O.K. 
CABBY: I hate to tell you this, but you're here to see me. So I 
guess I better not run the light. 
K.: No, because I'm not just any passenger. I understand that 
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running the light is morally appropriate here. So if you run the 
light, it won't cause me to disobey laws in other circumstances 
where it wouldn't be morally appropriate. 
The light is still red, and the snow is beginning to fall more 
heavily. 
CABBY: I get it. So if it was just any dummy in the back seat, I 
should stay at the light, but if it's a law professor I should run 
it? 
K. [still in classroom mode]: Well, that might be part of the 
calculation. But anyway, what you have t o  do is decide the best 
thing to do under all the circumstances. If you factor in all the 
concrete effects of obeying or disobeying the law in a particular 
case, you'll make the right decision. 
CABBY: But once I factor in all those concrete reasons, there 
won't be anything left over about obeying the law. I mean, it 
won't be one factor in my calculation that, like in the abstract 
you might say, you ought t o  obey the law? Is that right? 
While the driver has been talking, K. has been looking around 
the cab. K. hears a ticking noise, but can't figure out where it's 
coming fiom-certainly not K.'s quartz watch, though K. checks 
it anyway. During the remainder of the dialogue, the ticking 
sound will fade in and out; K. will somewhat furtively look 
around, check inside pockets, look on the floor, and so forth. 
K.: No, because you've already taken into account all the rea- 
sons why obeying the law in this particular situation would be 
good. So there's nothing left over to  factor in. That's why some 
people think that the duty to obey the law is an empty concept; 
it doesn't add anything to the analysis of any particular situa- 
tion. 
CABBY: An empty concept, huh? I like that. Seems like there's a 
lot of that going around. [He hums a Greek-sounding tune ab- 
sently to himself; deep in thought.] I gotta admit, I'm still a 
little puzzled. If there's no duty to obey the laws-not even a 
prima facie whatever you called it-then why even have laws? I 
gotcha there, don't I? 
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K. [continuing to look around for the source of the ticking 
noise]: No, that's not right. Laws are still useful. They provide 
guidance about what is usually the best thing to do. Like, usu- 
ally it's a good idea to stop at red lights because it avoids acci- 
dents. 
CABBY: So in a way, the law isn't a command. It's more like 
information that you're getting about the best thing to do. Is 
that it? 
K.: Exactly. 
CABBY: This empty concept idea is dynamite. I love it! But look, 
I'm not just any old Joe off the street, I'm a cab driver. When I 
got my license, I promised to obey the traffic laws. Actually, 
when you think about it, I also promised to obey the laws when 
I became a U.S. citizen. Don't I have a duty to keep my word? 
K.: Yeah, a lot of my students say that too. But the same anal- 
ysis applies. Just  think it through. The fact that  you made a 
promise is relevant to determining what is the best thing to do 
under all the circumstances. But there's no such thing as a 
prima facie duty to honor promises. 
CABBY: Then what is the point of making a promise? 
K. [beginning to find the driver a rather dull if not irritatingly 
persistent student]: Again, it's information. You're telling people 
what your present intentions are and inviting them to rely on 
that. If you break the promise, you have to consider the impact 
on the institution of promise making, just like you have to 
consider the impact on legal compliance by others if you break 
a law. It's the same thing exactly. 
CABBY: I guess you would also say that the duty to tell the 
truth is also an empty concept. 
K. [to the audience]: Is this guy ever going to shut up? [To the 
driver again, in an impatient tone] That is the logical implica- 
tion. 
CABBY: So if someone makes you a promise, or if they tell you 
something, they have no prima facie duty of honesty. 
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K. [another aside]: Do things like this ever happen to other 
people or is this some kind of curse? This is beginning to seem 
like an  episode of The Twilight Zone, featuring the Socratic 
Cab Driver From Hell. [Turning back to the driver] No, there's 
no prima facie duty to be honest, only a duty to be honest or to 
keep your promise if that is the best thing to do under all of 
the circumstances. 
By this time, snow is beginning to pile up on the cab. After 
checking the time, K. sighs heavily. The driver seems deter- 
mined to talk all night. During this part of the dialogue, the 
driver becomes more formal, sounding more like his philosopher 
namesake and less like a stereotypical taxi driver; for this rea- 
son he is now referred to in the script by his surname. 
SOCRATES: So if someone makes me a promise, they are making 
a statement-which may or may not be truthful, depending on 
all the circumstances-about their present intentions, which 
they either will or will not carry into effect, depending on all of 
the circumstances. Would i t  be wise to rely on such a promise? 
K. [stifling a yawn]: Perhaps not. 
SOCRATES: And if that is so, would not a society of individuals 
holding that view be gravely defective? 
K.: How so? 
SOCRATES: IS it not desirable that the individuals in  a society 
be able to trust each other? 
K.: Yes. 
SOCRATES: But a society following your way of thought would 
be lacking in trust, would it not? Or a t  least, would it not have 
less trust than a society that believed in a duty to obey the law, 
honor promises, and tell the truth? 
K. lplucking lint from clothes]: Yes, I suppose so. 
SOCRATES: But can a view of morality be correct if adherence to 
it would produce a morally inferior society as compared with 
another view? 
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K. [who really hasn't been listening very carefully but wants to 
be polite]: I guess not .  . . Shouldn't we pay rent on this as a 
parking space? I mean, we've been here for hours. 
SOCRATES [seeming determined to stick to the subject]: So your 
theory of legal obligation must be defective, wouldn't you ad- 
mit? And we seem to be left with no answer to the question, is 
there a duty to obey the law? 
& begins searching for the source of the ticking noise again; by 
now K. feels a bit like Captain Hook pursued by the ticking 
crocodile. Looking to the front of the cab, K. notices that the 
meter is running. The total fare has now reached $137. 
K.: You didn't tell me that  the meter was running, you turkey. 
SOCRATES [sarcastically]: It didn't seem like the best thing to 
do under all of the circumstances. 
K.: Don't give me that crap. 
SOCRATES: Hey, maybe we should discuss this. When is it un- 
just to require payment of a debt? An interesting question . . . 
K.: Look, you jerk, I'm not going to spend the rest of the night 
playing this game with you. Here's twenty bucks, pal. I'm going 
to walk home. 
K. jumps out of the cab and slams the door. 
SOCRATES [almost muttering to himselfl: What made you think 
knowledge would be cheap? 
K. [walking a few steps, slipping and almost falling in the 
snow, then turning around and shaking a fist at S O C R A ~ S ] :  
Hey, buddy, get a life! 
As K. trudges away through the snowdrifts, the light changes to 
green. The cab starts o f f ,  and then abruptly vanishes into the 
swirling snow, as the curtain falls. 
